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Effectiveness of
the Social Security Review
System in Disability Cases
William D. Popkin*
1. AGENCY CONSTRAINTS
T he effectiveness of administrative adjudication can be determined
only in the context of the constraints faced by an agency. Three
major constraints confront the Social Security Administration in resolv-
ing disability disputes; the large volume of cases; the difficulty of the
legal issue to be resolved; and the relationship of the federal govern-
ment to the state agencies which make the initial disability deter-
mination.
The disability program' generated over one million applications last
year. Less.than twenty percent of these claims were easily disposed of
on technical grounds and the remainder involved varying degrees of
complexity. Some cases were resolved easily in the claimant's favor by
the application of rules of thumb contained in the regulations based
on the age, work experience, and educaton of the claimant. Another
group of cases was decided in favor of the claimant solely on the basis
of medical impairments specified by regulation. The medical issue
might have been an easy one, based on unambiguous diagnostic tests,
or a complex one, involving lower back injuries or psycho-neurotic
disturbances.
*Associate Professor, Indiana University, School of Law (Bloomington).
1Our discussion is limited to the disability program funded by payroll taxes.
The new Supplementary Security Income program will generate additional claims.
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The agency has only limited authority, however, to issue regulations
to dispose of cases on simple legal criteria or on the basis of medical
judgment. The ultimate issue in Social Security disability cases not
disposed of on the grounds just mentioned is the most difficult of all
disability issues. The individual's residual capacity to function must be
determined after account is taken of the medical impairment, and this
capacity must be matched with jobs available on the national market
in the light of the individual's vocational background. Furthermore,
the disability issue is "all or nothing." There is no room for surrepti-
tious compromise. The claimant is either disabled or not disabled and
there is no opportunity, by allowing a recovery for partial disability,
to satisfy the claimant with a portion of a loaf. Finally, the government
is unable to indulge a simplifying presumption in favor of the claimant
as it does in the Federal Employees Compensation and the Veterans
disability programs. Social Security is not limited to a favored group
of individuals, such as veterans and workers who suffer disabilities in
connection with their work.
The third constraint, besides the volume of cases and the difficulty
of the legal issue, is the relationship of the federal agency to state Vo-
cational Rehabilitation Agencies. These state agencies are responsible
for initial disability determinations and they are extremely jealous of
their prerogatives. They are staffed by doctors and vocational evalua-
tors, who are not lawyers. No critique of the current system can avoid
these political and personnel limitations on changes in the present way
of doing things.
With this background, the effectiveness of the review system can be
examined from several perspectives. The first is the managerial per-
spective: how effective is the agency in sifting out easier cases at earlier
stages of decision. The second perspective is judicial: does the judge
function properly at the hearing level. The third perspective is from
the claimant's point of view: does the claimant have adequate access
to representation to present his case effectively.
2. MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE
As noted above, the Social Security Administration has a limited
ability to simplify the issues to avoid the question of economic dis-
ability. The state agencies are able to dispose of approximately 94%
of the cases, either by allowing a little less than one-half of the claims
on grounds other than economic disability, or by disallowing a little
less than one-half of the claims on technical grounds or because the
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claimant was not economically disabled. The state agency is instructed
by the federal Bureau of Disability Insurance to presume that a claim-
ant is not economically disabled. Of the remaining 6% of the cases
(around 60,000) which are reviewed by an administrative law judge
(ALJ), almost half are reversed.
At the outset, it should be remembered that this reversal rate does
not necessarily reflect adversely on the state's decision-making process.
The file is "open" in the sense that new evidence may be submitted to
the ALJ. Many "reversals" are really "allowances" based on evidence
not previously presented. One suggestion which deserves consideration
is to allow the ALJ to remand the case to the state agency for further
development and decision whenever there is new evidence.
The "reversal" rate is also understandable for another reason. Most
of the cases which reach the hearing stage involve economic disability
issues. It is no reflection on the state agency that it has been unable to
resolve cases in favor of claimants on this ground. First, the doctors
and vocational specialists who decide cases at the state level do not see
the claimant and it is difficult to make judgments concerning inability
to work unless the claimant has been confronted. An experiment al-
lowing state officials to interview claimants has been tried but appar-
ently rejected because of uncertain costs.
Even if a personal meeting were arranged, however, there would be
a second reason for not expecting the state agency to decide in favor of
the claimant on grounds of economic disability. Economic disability is
not an issue which can best be handled by doctors and civil servants
who are not lawyers. The issue is a complex legal one involving careful
scrutiny of the validity of medical judgments and the application of
the standards of employability contained in the Act to those medical
judgments, translated from medical terminology into specific impair-
ments of bodily functions. The inappropriateness of state agency
adjudication of these issues has been recognized, as we noted earlier,
by the presumption against economic disability contained in the federal
instructions to the state officials.
It might be suggestea that the state agency's inability to deal with
economic disability is not really a problem because the claimant can
always get an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. But many claimants
do not appeal. Furthermore, claimants have six months to appeal to an
ALJ and they often delay until this period has almost expired. Mean-
while, they are not receiving payments.
The solution is to find some way of identifying cases involving eco-
nomic disability issues at an early stage of adjudication and to present
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these cases to qualified judges for decision. Differentiation of cases
within an agency for handling by officials with disparate training is not
a novelty. The analogy that comes to mind is the Internal Revenue
Service's use of revenue agents for more complicated business audits
and revenue officers for the simpler cases involving individual personal
returns. The Social Security Administration currently classifies cases
by 13 body systems (e.g., cardiovascular, sense organs, etc.). Perhaps a
study of the relationship of the affected body system to the issues aris-
ing on appeal might enable advance identification of economic dis-
ability cases.
If the appropriate cases can be identified, who should the judge be?
One possibility is for the case to be immediately referred to an ALJ for
a determination based on an evidentiary hearing. This will mean more
work for the ALJs, however, and also encroach upon the state agency's
prerogatives. Another alternative is to require state agencies to hire
individuals who are capable of hearing and deciding such issues and
to allow a de novo appeal to ALJs, much as the Tax Court currently
reviews the decisions of IRS personnel.
3. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
Even if the problem of sifting out difficult cases is effectively handled,
the role of the ALJ must be evaluated. The problem of the ALJ's role
is the much discussed question of the non-adversary nature of the
evidentiary hearing. By non-adversary I refer to the fact that the gov-
ernment does not have an attorney; the claimant's lack of an attorney
is discussed in a later section.
Two problems arise from the government's failure to have an attor-
ney. First, a government attorney can perform many useful functions
in developing a case which are presently thrust upon the ALJ. How-
ever, the problem of case development does not necessarily have to be
resolved by hiring government attorneys. Effective utilization by ALJs
of hearing assistants, if a sufficient number were provided, might handle
the case development problem and free ALJs for deciding cases. The
assignment of law clerks to judges is, of course, not unfamiliar. Law
clerks are available to the Board of Veterans Appeals and to the Ap-
peals Council in the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals of the Social
Security Administration.
A second problem is the danger of bias and appearance of bias when
the ALJ is responsible for developing a case and then deciding it. My
own guess concerning the appearance of bias is that claimants do not
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have this perception. It seems likely that the claimant's pleasure at
seeing the person who is deciding his case and the ALJ's effectiveness
in bending over backwards to appear fair prevent any appearance of
pro-government prejudice.
The risks of actual bias also appear to be slight. The danger of a
predetermined bias in favor of the government seems greatest when an
ALJ has responsibility for the initial development of a case and when
the case arises to vindicate agency policy. Neither of these problems are
presented in Social Security disability adjudication. The ALJ's re-
sponsibility is not to handle the initial development of the case, but
to probe an already well-developed case. Furthermore, the case is
initiated by a claimant seeking benefits under a mass benefit program,
not by an agency which has selected the case to implement its policies.
Even if the adjudication process could benefit from the presence of
government attorneys, however, careful attention must be paid to the
disadvantages. First, the problem of the claimant's lack of representa-
tion, discussed below, becomes far more serious if the government has
an attorney. The appearance of unfairness would be considerable.
Second, the hiring of a government attorney is likely to accentuate the
spirit of adversariness. Each side would be more prone to hire its own
experts. There is serious doubt whether conflicting experts bring
enough (or any) advantages in determining the truth to offset the social
cost that this would involve, especially in view of the shortage of good
doctors to perform this task. The recent trend in personal injury liti-
gation has been away from courtroom resolution of such disputes, as
evidenced by "no-fault" insurance.
There are two qualifications to these observations which might affect
a very limited number of cases heard by ALJs. First, if disputes which
do not involve a clash of experts can be identified, the government
might be represented with little risk of an increase in adversary spirit.
Cases involving legal issues devoid of medical questions, such as the
status of a person as an employee eligible for social security benefits,
would fit the description. Attorneys represent the government in Fed-
eral Employee Compensation Appeals and their primary role is to be
useful when there are difficult legal questions not involving a dispute
over the degree of disability.
Second, there may be advantages to allowing government attorneys
to handle cases on remand from a court. ALJs may be especially sensi-
tive about probing the facts in these cases because they have already
been reversed by a higher authority. Furthermore, claimants are repre-
sented in virtually all of these cases.
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A final word of caution about non-adversary hearings concerns the
GS-15 grade level of Social Security ALJs and the higher grade level
usually held by ALJs in the regulatory agencies. The delicate role of
investigating and judging medical evidence as it relates to economic
disability calls for extreme sensitivity to the complex role that the
judge must play, and requires considerable skills in cross-examination.
These facts alone would seem to justify a grade GS-16 for Social Security
ALJs. There is a further reason for equalizing the grade levels, how-
ever. The judge's legal skills must be supplemented by a thorough
knowledge of the substantive features of the disability program. The
qualifications of an ALJ, which are primarily those of a skilled lawyer
familiar with adjudication, are not enough. If ALJs seek jobs in the
regulatory agencies to improve their status, they are likely to leave the
Social Security Administration just when they are acquiring the
necessary expertise. Indeed, if there were a heavy turnover in Social
Security ALJs, it might be necessary to reconsider the recommendation
made above that government attorneys are unnecessary. Such attorneys
might be essential to compensate for inexperienced ALJs.
4. CLAIMANT'S PERSPECTIVE
The third perspective for evaluating the effectiveness of Social
Security adjudication is the claimant's access to a representative to
present his case effectively. One Social Security study has shown a
positive relationship between a representative and claimant success.
Much more information is needed, however, before translating this
finding into a recommendation. First, it is possible that representatives
take easy cases in the first place. Second, even if representatives are
effective in winning cases, it is unclear by what process this would be
accomplished. Is it by marshalling evidence, by written argument, by
examining or cross-examining witnesses, or by some other means? If
their major function is to gather expert testimony, the solution may not
be more representatives for claimants, but rather greater care by the
agency in developing cases for the claimants and perhaps even free
medical examinations by doctors chosen by the claimant. Third, differ-
ent kinds of representatives may have varying effects. Representatives
may be attorneys, law students, non-attorney specialists in disability
adjudication, employees of unions or of veterans' organizations, or
other para-professionals.
My own guess is that representatives help claimants, but that there
is no need that they be attorneys. Indeed, non-attorney specialists
SYMPOSIUM: ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 85
(para-professionals) may do a far more effective job in an area as un-
familiar to most practitioners as disability claims adjudication, where
gathering evidence for orderly presentation and reinforcing the claim-
ant's confidence may be the major skills needed. Attorneys, especially
if their training is in courtroom litigation, may even have an adverse
effect on the proceedings by mystifying the claimant and "over-pro-
ceduralizing" the hearing.
The major skill para-professionals may lack is the ability to cross-
examine. The recent Supreme Court case of Richardson v. Wright (405
U.S. 208 (1972)) has questioned the importance of cross-examination
when conclusory judgments are being challenged (whether the claimant
is disabled, for example), rather than the credibility or veracity of the
witness. But even if we concede the importance of cross-examination
in probing the assumptions which lie behind conclusions about medi-
cal impairments and disability, a note of realism is in order. Most
attorneys cannot cross-examine very well. As long as that is true, it is
better to accept and even encourage para-professionals to represent
claimants than to hold out for an unattainable ideal.
There are elements of unrealism, however, in a decision to encour-
age para-professional assistance in Social Security adjudication. There
is no natural group, such as a union or a veterans organization, which
can produce para-professionals to represent claimants on a large scale,
and law students are not likely to fill the vacuum. It is very difficult to
organize para-professional assistance from the bottom up when eco-
nomic rewards are not great.
I, therefore, have no recommendation to make at present about repre-
sentation for claimants. I simply do not know how effective repre-
sentatives are, what they would do for the claimant if they were effec-
tive, how different kinds of representatives would perform, and where
the representatives would come from. I am sure, however, that the
current standards of due process set by the Supreme Court should not
limit our consideration of this problem. Even though the Court has
not extended the right to free counsel to civil cases, 2 our concern with
access to effective administrative review need not be so restricted. The
shortage of representatives, the uncertainty about their utility and
their effect on the hearing process, and the varieties of possible financ-
ing techniques to provide free representation probably make it de-
sirable for the Court to be wary of a hasty extension of a right to free
2Nor is it likely to do so in the near future. Cf., U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
(no waiver of filing fee in bankruptcy cases); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S, 656
(1973) (no waiver of filing fee on appeal in welfare cases).
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counsel outside of the criminal area. The Court's legitimate impotence
to resolve this problem, however, is a challenge to others to develop
appropriate solutions.
5. CONCLUSION
A final word is in order concerning the role of the legal profession
in considering the issues I have discussed. It is no accident that the
problems referred to in this paper-managerial considerations, non-
adversary procedures, and the use of para-professionals in ad-
ministrative adjudication-have not received much attention from the
profession. Lawyers have not been too concerned with administering
their own offices, let alone public administration. Non-adversary pro-
cedures are not very Anglo-Saxon and are even faintly immoral.
Para-professionals are often though of as a threat to the profession and
discussion of the subject usually ends up with a debate over unau-
thorized practice of the law. Nonetheless we must face these problems
if the legal profession is to meet the challenge of mass administration
of distributive justice.
